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THE RIGHT TO DIE AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT:
COMPASSION AND DYING AFTER
GLUCKSBERG AND VACCO
Robert M. Hardaway*
MirandaK. Peterson**

CassandraMann***
"Dying is personal"'

INTRODUCTION

A majority of Americans support legalizing physician-assisted suicide.2 Clearly, many doctors are willing to help patients who wish to end
their lives. A 1994 study of physicians in Washington State published in
the Journal of the American Medical Association found that physicians
had assisted twenty-five percent of all patient requests for assisted
suicide.' A 1997 study of physicians in the San Francisco Bay area reported that fifty-three percent of physicians admitted to assisting in the
suicide of their patient. 4 Yet physician-assisted suicide is legal in only one
state in the country--Oregon.
5
On November 5, 1997, Oregon enacted the Death with Dignity Act,
recognizing the right to physician-assisted suicide for the first time in
modem American history.6 The law, however, remains controversial.
• Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
University of Denver College of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 1999.
University of Denver College of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 1999.
1 See Cnizan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 See MARILYN WEBB, THE GOOD DEATH 393 (1997) (citing 1996 Washington Post survey);
see also David A. Levine, Legalizing Physician Assisted Suicide: Michigan and Oregon, 8 BROWN U.
LONG-TERM CARE QUALITY LETTR, Apr. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9006372 (citing Michigan
survey on physician-assisted suicide).
3 See WEBB, supranote 2, at 386.
4 See id.
5 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1997).
6 The move toward the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon began in November
1994 when Oregon voters approved Measure 16, a Right to Die initiative. Before the initiative could
take effect, however, the National Right to Life Committee and other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in U.S.
District Court in Eugene, Oregon. In Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995), Judge
Michael Hogan held the Right to Die statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and granted an injunction halting the law. In February 1997, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court on standing, ripeness, and jurisdictional grounds. See
Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub non. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S.
Ct. 328 (1997). On October 27, the Court of Appeals lifted the injunction. Id. at 1382. On November 4,
Oregon voters overwhelmingly rejected an attempt to repeal the Right to Die Statute by a 60-40 margin. Finally, on November 5, the Oregon Attorney General declared that terminally ill patients were
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After the statute's passage, Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
Administrator Thomas Constantine wrote to House Judiciary Chairman
Henry Hyde (R-ll.) suggesting that the DEA could revoke the licenses of
Oregon doctors who prescribe drugs to assist suicides under the Oregon
act.7 On June 5, 1998, however, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a
decision that federal drug agents may not prosecute doctors who help terminally ill patients under Oregon's Death with Dignity statute.' Reno reiterated President Clinton's opposition to assisted suicide, but stressed that
the federal government would not challenge state laws or seek to override
the decision of Oregon voters on this issue.9
In January 1998, the Portland Oregonian reported the story of the
first person to be affected by Oregon's Death with Dignity statute.10 Ray
Frank had been diagnosed with terminal cancer in October 1997. He suffered from oxygen-deprivation in his lung and a constant, horrifying sensation akin to being slowly buried alive.11 No medical procedure or drugs
were available to alleviate the horror and anguish of his suffering. Doctors
told Frank he had no choice but to die in agony, because they feared that if
they took any action to end his suffering they would lose their licenses to
practice or become liable for criminal charges of murder. 12
In any other state in the union, and in most other countries in the
world, 13 Frank would have had to choose between dying a slow, agonizing
free to ask doctors to help end their lives. See Steve Suo et al., Jury'sStill Out on Assisted Suicide, Foe
Contends, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 6, 1997, at A-14. Although an attorney representing the
plaintiffs in Lee v. Oregon disputed this declaration, the Attorney General's declaration was considered
authorative. Id. On September 23, 1998, Judge Hogan refused to revive the original lawsuit, holding
that it was "indistinguishable" from the one thrown out by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Judge Rejects Challenge to Suicide Law, AM. HEALTH LINE, Sept. 24, 1998, available in Westlaw,
APN-HE Library.
7 See Reno Gives Oregon 'Another Victory'for Terminally Ill, U.S. NEwSWIRE, June 5, 1998,
availablein 1998 WL 5686502.
8 See D.C. Acts Quickly on Oregon'sRight-to-Die Law, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June
6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4296275.
9 See The Laboratory of the States, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 10, 1998, at B6, available
in 1998 WL 3338598; Ms. Reno Is Right, TIMES UNION, June 9, 1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL
7261617.
10 See Barbara Combs Lee, It Worked FirstTime, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 18, 1998, at G-5.
II See id.
12 See Antonio P. Tsarouhas, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv.
793, 799 (1994). In 1986, Dr. Pete Roser was charged with first degree murder in the death of his wife.
The jury, however, acquitted the doctor because of the inability of the prosecution to prove causation.
Similarly, Dr. Richard Schaeffer was arrested under the suspicion of murdering his patient by lethal
injection, although it was later announced that there would be no charge made against the doctor. See
id. (quoting DEREK HuMPHRY & ANN WICKEIT, THE RIGHT TO DIE 12 (1986)). Similarly, in 1986, Dr.
Joseph Hassman was found guilty of murder when he injected a fatal dose of Demerol in his eightyyear-old mother-in-law who was terminally ill. Dr. Hassman was sentenced to two years of community
service. See id.; see also People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). Dr. Kevorkian has
assisted in at least 16 suicides in which either all charges have been dismissed or a jury has acquitted
Kevorkian. See ChargesAgainst Kevorkian Dropped, PATRIOT LEDGER (Mass.), Jan. 11, 1997, at 01.
13 The one notable exception is Holland. See Joseph P. Shapiro, Euthanasia'sHome: What the

1999]

THE RIGHT TO DIE AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT

death, or flouting the law and take his own life. 4 Indeed, on November 22,
1997, Frank decided to take his own life with a shotgun.
The Oregon Death with Dignity statute passed just in time. The Death
with Dignity statute permits, but does not require, doctors to prescribe lifeending medication. 5 Because no medication or drugs could alleviate
Dutch Experience Can Teach Americans About Assisted Suicide, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 13,
1997, at 26. Under Dutch law, a patient must be mentally competent, request death voluntarily and
repeatedly, and the suffering without prospect of relief. In addition, the doctor must consult with another physician. "[S]ince 1981 ... only twenty doctors have been prosecuted for violating the Dutch
guidelines and only six have received prison sentences- all suspended ... But one in five of the unreadable cases involved the most vexing kind of euthanasia, death at a patient's request." Id. at 25; see
also Jim Persels, Forcing the Issue of PhysicianAssisted Suicide: Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the
EuthanasiaDebate, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 104 (1993).
14 See generally Rasmussen v. Flemming, 741 P.2d 674, 679 (Ariz. 1987) (describing a patient
who endured three strokes and experienced a generative neural muscular disease and/or an organic
brain syndrome); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299-300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (describing a 28-year-old woman whose physical handicap progressed to the point where she was completely bedridden, could only move a few fingers of one hand, and had to depend on others to meet all
of her needs); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (describing a
70-year-old man suffering from emphysema who required a ventilator after a medical mishap and
thereafter described his life as "intolerable"); In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Del. 1995) (describing
a woman who became paralyzed on the left side of her body and could neither recognize her daughter
nor chew or swallow food); Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. Super. CL
1984) (describing a woman with multiple sclerosis who, having lost her eyesight and control over her
motor skills, required a respirator and had to receive nutrients through a nasogastric tube); In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990) (describing a patient whose life could be prolonged via life-support up to one year despite severe brain damage due to hemorrhaging); In re
Gardner, 534 A. 2d 947, 949 (Me. 1987) (describing a patient who was "almost totally spastic" whose
legs needed to be pried apart in order to wash him and had no voluntary movements.); Mack v. Mack,
618 A.2d 744, 746 (Md. 1993) (describing a patient suffering from a severe brain injury, whose arms
and legs became spastic, and who lost control over his bowel and bladder, so that he needed to be fed
through a tube.); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Mass. 1980) (describing a man suffering from
kidney disease as well as chronic organic brain syndrome, whose treatment caused side effects such as
dizziness, leg cramps and headaches and triggered aggression which had to be controlled by sedation.);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990) (describing a quadriplegic who desired to be
released from life-sustaining treatment); In re Jobes 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1986) (describing 31year-old woman who suffered oxygen deprivation and loss of blood flow to the brain, and was rendered incontinent and mute).
15 The most important provisions of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act read as follows:
§3.01 ATTENDING PHYSICIAN RESPONSIBILITIES.
The attending physician shall:
(1) Make the initial determination of whether a patient has a terminal disease, is
capable, and has made the request voluntarily;
(2) Inform the patient of:
(a) his or her medical diagnosis;
(b) his or her prognosis;
(c) the potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed;
(d) the probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed;
(e) the feasible alternatives, including, but not limited, to comfort care, hospice
care and pain control.
(3) Refer the patient to a consulting physician for medical confirmation of the diagnosis, and for a determination that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily;

§

4.01 IMMUNITIES
Except as provided in Section 4.02:
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Frank's suffering, his doctor decided to do nothing and left Frank to his
final agonies.
Before Frank could commit suicide on his own, a friend called Compassion in Dying, a non-profit organization that provides counseling for
the terminally ill. Compassion in Dying told Frank about the risks of taking his own life with a shotgun, including the risk that he might survive the
shooting, and be in even greater agony. More importantly, ending his life
in this way would deprive his daughter 16and friends of being with him and
holding him in their arms when he died.
Compassion in Dying urged Frank to seek a doctor who would allow
him to die with dignity. Following this advice, Frank located a doctor who
was willing to assist his suicide under the Death with Dignity law. Knowing that his suffering would soon end, Frank decided not to use the shotgun
to take his own life and instead began waiting the 15 days required under
the statute before making his final request for a doctor's help."7 Before the
however, Frank died peacefully in the company of
waiting period expired,
18
friends and family.
The fact that Frank lived longer, rather than shorter, under Oregon's
physician-assisted suicide statute is not surprising. Long before the passage of Dying with Dignity, a study by Preston and Mero revealed that
Right to Die statutes "paradoxically, can postpone life. Knowing one has a
fail-safe at the end can give patients a sense of control, a confidence to
endure more, and a belief that should things get too bad the means to a

quick end are at hand." 9
Right to Die statutes may not only reduce the pain and suffering of
the terminally ill, but may also prove to be an effective antidote to an epidemic of suicides. In some states suicide is the leading cause of death of
those between the ages of 14-54.20 In her landmark compendium, The
Good Death, Marilyn Webb tells the story of Glenn Leung. Paralyzed
from the neck down, constantly gasping for breath, unable even to adjust
his eyeglasses, wallowing in his own filth and degradation, his greatest

(1) No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action for participating in good faith compliance with this Act. This includes
being present when a qualified patient takes the prescribed medication to end his
or her life in a humane and dignified manner.
(2) No professional organization or association, or health care provider, may subject a person to censure, discipline, suspension, loss of license, loss of privileges,
loss of membership or other penalty for participating or refusing to participate in
good faith compliance with this Act.
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.815, 127.885 (1997).

16
17
18
19
20

See Lee, supra note 10.
See id.; see also Oregon Death with Dignity Act § 3.06, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840.
See Lee, supra note 10.
WEBB, supra note 2, at 389.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2272 (1997) (citation omitted).
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fear had been that "he'd be trapped inside himself and now he is."2 1 Many
suicide victims are desperate to avoid such a fate, and therefore commit
suicide prematurely, even though they must do so violently, away from
friends and family. They have no assurance that they will be in control
when their agony becomes unbearable. The tragedy is that thousands of
people will die prematurely in the remaining 49 states where citizens are
deprived of the right to physician-assisted suicide.
An optimistic view is that once fundamental rights are recognized in
one state, it will be difficult for other states, or even for the federal government, to deny those same rights to others. The Seattle Times recently
predicted that the Oregon statute could soon begin drawing out-of-state
residents who want a physician's help in ending their lives.2 2 A pessimistic
view is that the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize physician-assisted
suicide as a fundamental right will needlessly prevent many terminally ill
Americans from dying with dignity.
In Washington v. Glucksberg23 and Vacco v. Quill,24 the Supreme
Court held that the right to physician-assisted suicide is neither a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, nor a freedom
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the Court, a properly drafted ban on physician-assisted suicide is rationally related to legitimate government interests, and therefore
passes constitutional muster.
In neither Glucksberg nor Vacco did the Supreme Court address
whether physician-assisted suicide is protected under the Ninth Amendment. 25 In a concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg noted that "the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal
that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
constitutional amendments. ' 26 He further argued that "the framers did not
intend that the first eight amendments were to be construed to exhaust the
27
basic fundamental rights which the constitution granted to the people.,
Physician-assisted suicide should be recognized as such as fundamental
right.
This Article argues that the right to determine the manner and method
21
22
6, 1997,
23
24
25

WEBB, supra note 2, at 353.
See Carol M. Ostrom, Oregon Suicide Law Could Draw Out of Staters, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
at B-4.
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997).
U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be

construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
26 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.s 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
27

Id.
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of one's own death should be protected as a fundamental right under the
Ninth Amendment. Part I reviews the historical development of physician
assisted suicide, describes current medical practices and physicians' attitudes, and outlines the related legal debate over euthanasia. Part II explains
the statutory and case law precedent of physician-assisted suicide. This
Part also examines the factual and procedural history of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco. Part III explores the Ninth
Amendment issues which the Court failed to address in Glucksberg and
Vacco, and argues that a right to die exists under existing Ninth Amendment precedent. This part also provides recommendations for a model
Dignity in Dying statute that would comply with the Ninth Amendment.
The Article concludes by urging courts and lawmakers to recognize the
fundamental right of citizens to make the most personal of all decisions,
namely the time and manner of their own deaths.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

HistoricalPerspectives on Euthanasiaand Suicide

Passive physician-assisted suicide was widely practiced in ancient
Greece and Rome.28 Physicians felt obligated to abate the harshness of
disease and ease the patient's suffering. 29 Recognizing that ancient medicine could not remedy every illness, physicians would refuse to treat patients whose illnesses were too advanced in order to treat other patients
30
who could benefit from their treatment.
Ancient Greek society considered suicide illegal unless authorized by
the state. 3' The person was required to request permission of the Senate to
28 See Cara Elkin, Note, Renewed Compassionfor the Dying in Compassion in Dying v. State of
Washington, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (citation omitted). Euthanasia is derived from
the Greek words "Eu," which means "well" or "good," and "thanos," which means "death." Id.
29 See id.; see also EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 327, 329-31 (1951). The Oath of Hippocrates
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
I SWEAR by Apollo the-phsician, and Aesculapius, and Health, and All-heal, and
all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judgment, I will keep
this Oath and this stipulation .... I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider to benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will giveno deadly medicine
to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not
give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I
will pass my life and practice my Art. I will not cut person laboring under the
stone, but will leave this to be done by men who are practitioners of this work.
Hippocrates, The Oath (Francis Adams trans., visited Nov. 11, 1998) (400 B.C.) <http:/I
www.cs.bu.edu/staff/TA/jconsidi/oath.html>.
30 Indeed, prolonging the life of a person who would not recover was considered medically
unethical. See Elkin, supra note 28, at 6; see also DURKHEIM, supranote 29, at 329-31.
31 See DURKHEIM, supranote 29, at 329-30.
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kill himself by explaining "[t]he reasons which made life intolerable to
him... "32 If the request was granted, the suicide was legal.33 If a person
committed suicide in opposition to the Senate's verdict, burial was
denied.34
Ancient Roman law governing suicide was similar to Greek law. 35 A
person who wished to commit suicide was required to state the reasons
before the Senate. 36 The Senate decided whether the person could commit
suicide and the method by which the person could take his own life.37 The
Roman army practiced similar methods by requiring a soldier who attempted suicide to state plausible reasons for such an act.38 If the soldier
attempted suicide in order to avoid serving in the army, however, he was
punished by death.39 If the soldier could prove he had good reasons for his
suicide, he was dismissed from the army.'
Religion has strongly influenced societal views of suicide at least
since the third and fourth centuries. 41 Early Christianity viewed physicianassisted suicide as murder. 42 Suicide was considered a crime, such as murder or robbery.43 Persons assisting a suicide were considered accessories
and abettors who were also guilty of the crime.' Historically, Christians
believed that only God had the power to decide when someone should
45
die.
32 See id. at 330. The Senate stated:
Whoever no longer wishes to live shall state his reasons to the Senate, and after
having received permission shall abandon life. If your existence is hateful to you,
die; if you are overwhelmed by fate, drink the hemlock. If you are bowed with
grief, abandon life. Let the unhappy man recount his misfortune, let the magistrate
supply him with the remedy, and his wretchedness will come to an end.
Id. Roman law was similar to Greek law, including punishment for unauthorized suicides. See id. at
330-31.
33 See id.; see also Elkin, supra note 28, at 8 n.52.
34 See DURKHEIM, supra note 29, at 329-30. Punishment to the suicide victim's body was severe, including cutting the hand off of the body and burying it separately. These punishments were
rendered only when a person committed suicide without Senate authorization. See id.
35 See id. at 330. Although less is known about Roman legislation concerning suicide, it is
derived from Greek law; therefore, it probably contained similar provisions. See id.
36 Seeid.at331.
37 See id. If a person committed suicide without the Senate's permission, the body was tortured,
crucified, and left as prey for birds. See id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. If a soldier committed suicide out of guilt for a military mistake, however, his will was
deemed void and his property reverted to the public. See id.
41 See id. at 327; see also Elkin, supra note 28, at 8-9, n. 53 (citing HUMPHRY & WIcKETI,
supra note 12, at 303).
42 See Elkin, supranote 28, at 6; see also GERALD A. LARUE, PLAYING GOD (1996).
43 See Elkin, supra note 298 5-6, 9, n.58; see also How SHALL WE DIE?: HELPING CHRISTIANS
DEBATE AsSIsTED SUICIDE (Sally B. Geis & Donald E. Messer eds., 1997).
44 See Wilbur Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HARV. L. REV. 331, 335 (1903); see also
Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the 'Right to Die', 77
KY. LJ. 319 (1989).
45 See Elkin, supra note 28, at 9. The Catholic Church believes that "[o]nly God has the right to
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English common law adopted this perspective on suicide. 46 A person
who committed suicide was guilty of an offense against God and the
king.4 7 According to Blackstone:
The law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath a power to destroy
life, but by commission from God, the author of it; and, as the suicide is guilty of a double
offense, one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against the king, who hath an interest in
the preservation of all his subjects; the law has therefore ranked this among the highest
48
crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony, a felony committed on one's self ....

Punishment for suicide was severe and led to many barbarous customs,4 9 including an unceremonial burial. 50 Until 1823, English custom
mandated dragging the "suicide's body, pierced crossways with a stick,
through the streets and bury[ing] it on a highway without any ceremony."5 1
Sometimes the heart was removed from the body as a sign of disrespect.52
English common law recognized some exceptions to the harsh punishment for suicide. Both the Church and the law excused suicide if the
person was insane.53 Sane suicide, however, was considered to be a conscious act of the will against God's authority.54 Occasionally, insanity was
presumed in order to spare the grieving family from suffering the harsh
penalties assessed to their loved one's body.5 5 The Church also excused
suicide by women in order to escape a violation of their chastity.5 6
The concept of euthanasia became popular in the 1930s in the United
States and Britain.5 7 Britain's Euthanasia Legalization Society and the
Euthanasia Society of America were established to promote euthanasia and
legalize "mercy killings."58 In the 1950s, Glanville William's The Sanctity
take away the life of the innocent, and human suffering has a special value." Id. at 9 n.57 (quotation
omitted).
46 See id.; see also G. Steven Neeley, Self-DirectedDeath, Euthanasia,and the Termination of
Life-Support: ReasonableDecisions to Die, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 205, 208 (1994).
47 See Larremore, supra note 44, at 332.
48 Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *14).
49 See Neeley, supra note 46, at 209.
50 See id. at 9 n58. Civil penalties included confiscation of the person's goods and property to
the detriment of the survivors. See id. In 563 the council in Prague declared that victims of suicide
would be "[hionored with no memorial in the holy sacrifice of the mass, and the singing of psalms
should not accompany their bodies to the grave." DIJRKHEIM, supra note 29, at 327. Nobles were
declared commoners, and their forests and castles were destroyed. See id.
51 DuRKHEIM, supranote 29, at 328.
52 See Neeley, supra note 46, at 210.
53 According to Roman Catholic canon law, penalties for suicide are applicable only if the
suicide was committed deliberately. See id.
54 See id. at 211. In contrast, insanity absolved guilt. See id.
55 See id. Juries and clerics sometimes presumed insanity to avoid inflicting hardship on the
family. See id.
56 See Larremore, supra note 44, at 332.
57 See Beschle, supra note 44, at 323.
58 Id. Bills were introduced in Britain and the United States, but none were enacted. See id.
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of Life and the CriminalLaw, advocated "mercy killing" requested by terminally ill patients, sparking debate over euthanasia.5 9
In 1957, Pope Pius XII announced that a Catholic person need not
accept any extraordinary medical treatment, 6 even if death would result.6'
The Pope also allowed the administration of pain-relieving drugs to patients in unbearable pain, even if the drugs shortened the patient's life.6 2
The patient and doctor are not considered to be committing a sin or crime
as long as the primary purpose of the treatment is to relieve pain and suffering.6 3
B.

Current Medical Practices

Physician-assisted suicide is a common practice in the United States.
Physicians face increasing pressure to assist suffering patients end their
lives. One of the most recent studies of current practices surveyed physicians treating AIDS victims in the San Francisco Bay area. Fifty-three
percent of the physicians surveyed admitted to assisting patients with suicide.' A survey conducted by the New England Journal of Medicine revealed that one in five physicians prescribed medication with the intent to
aid their patients' desire to terminate their suffering.65
A 1996 Michigan survey questioned 1,119 physicians in those specialties most likely to encompass patients with terminal illnesses, and 998
adults within the general public. When asked whether physician-assisted
suicide should be legalized, fifty-six percent of the physicians and sixtysix percent of the general public said yes. If physician assisted suicide
were legalized, thirty-five percent of the physicians
polled indicated that
66
they might aid in a patient's suicide upon request.
An Oregon poll of 2,761 Oregon physicians specializing in internal
medicine, family practice, neurology, general practice, gynecology, therapeutic radiology and surgery, found that sixty percent supported legalization in some cases. Forty-six percent confirmed that they might be willing
to perform physician-assisted suicide when asked by a patient. Thirty-one
59 Id. The book received much criticism. See id.
60 Elkin, supra note 28, at 9.
61

See id.; see also GERALD A. LARUE, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION (1985).

62 See Elkin, supra note 28, at 9.
63 See id. at 9-10 n.62.
64 WEBB, supra note 2, at 386.
65 Andrew Benton, Comment, PersonalAutonomy and Physician-AssistedSuicide: The Appropriate Response to a Modem Ethical Dilemma, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 769, 771 (1994) ("[A] recent
survey of physicians in the New England region indicated that one in five doctors had prescribed drugs
in a manner ... to facilitate their patients requests [to end their suffering]." (quotation omitted)); James
K. Rogers, Punishing Assisted Suicide: Where Legislators Should Fear to Tread, 20 OHIO N.U. L.
REv. 647, 654 n.58 (1994) ("[A] Physicians' Management Magazine poll revealed that ten percent of
those responding had assisted suicide in some way." (citation omitted)).
66 See Levine, supra note 2.
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percent said they were reluctant for moral reasons. Twenty-one percent of
the physicians reported that they had been requested to assist in suicide,
and seven percent assented.67
A Washington study randomly canvassed twenty-five percent of the
primary care physicians, as well' as those subspecialties inclined to treat
terminally ill patients. Out of 1,453 physicians, 828 responded. Twenty-six
reported that they had received requests for assistance in committing suicide.68 In 1994 alone, twelve percent received one or more requests for
assisted suicide. Physicians who replied stated that 15 out of 38 patients
accepting a prescription intended for suicide do not use the prescription.
These findings are comparable to those in Holland, where physicianassisted suicide is legal, doctors sanction nearly the same percentage of
requests. 69 Finally, the questionnaire asked if the respondent had ever administered a lethal dose of medication to a patient. Fifty-three percent of
the physicians admitted to assisting in suicide of a patient.7 ° Thus, although physician-assisted suicide is illegal in 49 of fifty states, many physicians are willing to help patients with terminal illnesses end their lives if
that is what they desire. Doctors, perhaps more than lawmakers, recognize
that helping a terminally-ill patient end his life in the manner of his own
choosing is a compassionate way to help him achieve death with dignity.
C.

Passive Euthanasia
Euthanasia is commonly categorized as either passive or active.7 1

67 See id.
68 See Survey Asks Washington Doctors About Suicide Assistance, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 1,
1996.
69 See id.
70 See EuthanasiaAIDS PhysiciansAssist Terminally Ill to End Their Lives, DISEASE WKLY.
PLus, Feb. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7719407. This study was performed by the author of the
1990 study, based on an anonymous questionnaire, and was founded on a hypothetical patient with
AIDS, to reflect the physician's beliefs and attitudes regarding assisted suicide.
71 See Eugenie Anne Gifford, Comment, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the Art of
Dying, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1546 n.3 (1993); see also BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 178 (4th ed.
1996) (defining euthanasia as active or passive); Elkin, supra note 28, at 10 n.63 (defining euthanasia
as passive or active); see also Kevin M. Stansbury, Casenote, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 623, 623 n.2
(1996)) (defining euthanasia as passive or active and the cognitive ability as voluntary or involuntary)
(citing HENRY R. GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE 10 (1992)).
A minority of commentators categorize euthanasia differently. See Elizabeth G. England,
Note, The Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide Reaches the Federal Courts. A Discussion of the
Decisions of the Districtand Circuit Courts in Compassion in Dying v. Washington State, 16 PACE L.
REv. 359, 360 (1996) (distinguishing euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide from the acts of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment); cf. also David L. Sloss, Note, The Right to
Choose How to Die: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of State Laws ProhibitingPhysician-Assisted Suicide,
48 STAN. L. REV. 937, 939 (1996) (stating that physician-assisted euthanasia refers to both physicianassisted suicide, which is labeled "artificial PAE," and acts of withholding or withdrawing life support
treatment, which is labeled "natural PAE"). For the purposes of this article, euthanasia is defined as
passive, involving the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment, and active, involving physi-
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Passive euthanasia involves allowing a patient to die by withholding or
withdrawing artificial life-support systems, including respirators, feeding
tubes, and life-sustaining medical treatment.72 This typically occurs when a
physician does not administer or discontinues life-sustaining treatment to
the patient, at the patient or surrogate decision-maker's request.73 Passive
euthanasia may involve competent or mentally incompetent patients.7 4
Active euthanasia occurs when a physician administers or provides the
life-ending treatment or medication.
Euthanasia is further defined by the cognitive ability of the person to
refuse medical treatment or request physician-assisted suicide.75 Voluntary
euthanasia pertains to a patient's ability to rationally and competently consent to physician-assisted suicide or the refusal or withdrawal of medical
life-sustaining treatment.7 6 Involuntary euthanasia refers to an incompetent
patient's inability to consent to active or passive euthanasia.7 7
Unlike physician-assisted suicide, passive euthanasia is widely accepted, practiced, and, in many cases, strongly welcomed. Almost every
8
jurisdiction in the United States allows some form of passive euthanasia
The most widely known cases allowing passive euthanasia are In re
Quinlan 9 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.8 0 A
discussion of these cases follows.
1.

In re Quinlan

In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a terminally ill patient or her surrogate decision maker has a constitutionally procian-assisted suicide.
72 See Gifford, supranote 71, at 1546 n.3.
73 See id.; see also England, supra note 71, at 360.
74 See England, supra note 71, at 360.
75 See Sloss, supra note 71, at 939 n.11; see also England, supra note 71, at 360 n.15 (referring
to "nonvoluntary" euthanasia as the physician administration of a lethal drug to an incompetent patient
at the request of a surrogate decisionmaker (citing Council Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2229
(1992)); Stansbury, supranote 71, at 623 n.2.
76 See Sloss, supra note 71, at 939.
77 See id.
78 See Gifford, supra note 71, at 1550. Several state courts have ruled in favor of allowing a
patient to refuse or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674, 682-83 (Ariz. 1987); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. '1989);
In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061 (Del. 1995); Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Estate of Longeway v. Community
Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Degrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993). For a
more complete listing of similar cases, see Sloss, supra note 71, at 945 n.45. In addition, most state
"living will" statutes allow a competent person to authorize a physician to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining medical treatment in the event that that person cannot make those decisions. Id at 945 n.49.
79 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
80 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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tected right to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment."' On April 15,
1975, twenty-one year old Karen Quinlan stopped breathing for at least
two 15 minute intervals.8 2 Placed on life-support, she was in a "chronic
persistent vegetative state."8 3 Karen's body maintained its basic functions-heart beat, pulmonary ventilation, digestion and basic motor reflexes-but she showed no signs of self-awareness or cognizance of her
surroundings.' After all possibility of recovery faded, Karen's father
sought permission from the court to have her life-sustaining medical
treatment withdrawn.8 5 The lower court denied his request, and he appealed. 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a person has a constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment in certain instances. This right is
grounded in the right to privacy. 7 Although the Constitution does not explicitly enumerate a right to privacy, the New Jersey court noted that the
Supreme Court recognized its existence in Griswold v. Connecticut.88 The
court reasoned that "this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much
the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy under certain conditions."8 9
The court balanced the State's interest in protecting human life and
the individual's right to die.9 ° "[T]he state's interest contra weakens and
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which
the individual's rights overcome the State interest." 9' Here, the court emphasized the patient's prognosis as to the reasonable chance of return to a
cognitive life.92 Where this prognosis is weak, the state's interests are out81

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (deciding that the right to privacy served as the legal basis for

choosing to cease life-sustaining measures and that the patient's incompetence gave the father standing
to assert this right); see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) ("An incompetent patient does
not lose his or her right the refuse life-sustaining treatment."); In re Schiller, 372 A.2d 360 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) ("The right of the individual, then is to have a determination that he or she can
make the determination and, if not, to have some competent able person to make it in the best interests

of the person.").
82
83

See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 653-54.
Id.

84
85
86
87

See
See
See
See

88

See id. ("The Court in Griswold found the unwritten constitutional right of privacy to exist in

id.
id. at 653.
id. at 651.
id. at 663.

the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights 'formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance."' (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965))).
89 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).

90 Seeid.
91

Id.

92 See id. at 669 ("The evidence in this case convinces us that the focal point of decision should
be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished
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weighed by the patient's right to die.
Although the court held that the right of privacy encompassed a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, that choice is based on the patient's competency to assert that right. 94 The court concluded that Karen's
right of privacy could be asserted on her behalf by her father serving as her
guardian. 95 According to the court:
[If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence
to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded 96
solely on the basis that
her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.

Allowing Karen's guardian to order the removal of life-sustaining medical
treatment was the only way she could exercise her right to privacy. 97
The court established additional factors that must be present before a
life-support system could be removed, including concurrence among family members and physicians, and approval from the hospital's ethics committee.98 Once these elements are satisfied, the life-support system may be
99
withdrawn without civil or criminal liability.
2.

Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Departmentof Health

In Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health, Nancy Cruzan
was in a chronic persistent vegetative state as a result of an automobile
accident.1 When it became clear that there was no chance of her regaining consciousness, Nancy's parents requested that the hospital remove the
artificial nutrition and hydration treatment.10 1 The hospital refused to withdraw the life-sustaining treatment without court approval. 102 The Missouri
from the continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen seems to be doomed.").
93 See id. at 664. The court weighed the state's interests and concluded: "We have no hesitancy
in deciding, in the instant diametrically opposite case, that no external compelling interest of the State
could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable months with no
realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life." Id. at 663; see also
Philip G. Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservationof Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 891, 895 (1989). The New Jersey Superior Court in In re Quackenbush extended the "bodily
invasion" of maintaining life support treatment on a patient in a vegetative state to include a patient
who required full amputation of both legs in order to live; the patient's right to privacy outweighed the
state's interest in the preservation of life. In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (N.J. Morris County
Ct. 1978).
94 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 672.
99 See id.
100 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 267 (1990).
101 See id. *
102 See id. at 268.
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Supreme Court held that Nancy's parents did not adequately prove that
Nancy would have wanted the treatment withdrawn had she been competent and therefore refused to order the hospital to stop treatment. 10 4
Under the doctrine of informed consent, a competent person has the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 105 When the U.S. Supreme
Court considered this case, it recognized that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in refusing medical treatment.1°6 However, the
Court refused to apply the doctrine of informed consent to incompetent
persons because they lack the ability to make an informed decision about
treatment. 10 7 According to the Court:
[T]he difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs the question: An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical
right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right' must be exercised for her, if at all,
10 8
by some sort of surrogate.

The Supreme Court upheld Missouri's requirement that the surrogate
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person
would have refused treatment had she been competent. 109 The Court balanced the State's interest in preserving human life against Nancy's liberty
103 See id.
104 See id. The Missouri Supreme Court recognized a right to refuse treatment based on the
common law doctrine of informed consent, but refused to apply the doctrine to this case. The Court
questioned the presence of a broad right to privacy embodied in the Constitution that would allow a
person to have the right to refuse medical treatment in every situation. The Court stated that "'[broad
policy questions bearing on life and death are more properly addressed by representative assemblies'
than judicial bodies." Id. at 269 (quotations omitted).
105 See id. at 277. Several cases have discussed the issue of withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining medical treatment. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 603
(Conn. 1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (111.1989); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209
(N.J. 1985); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987). Other cases demonstrate that the doctrine of
informed consent applies to a competent person's ability to withhold or withdraw life support systems.
See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re
Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass.
1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
106 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of the law." See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1; see also State v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1995) (following Cruzan by stating that this
liberty interest is not absolute and must be balanced with state interests).
107 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
t08 Id.
109 See id. The clear and convincing standard of proof has been defined as "proof sufficient to
persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life
supports under the circumstances." Id. at 284 n.l I (quoting In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531
N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988)); see also In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061 (Del. 1995) (following Cruzan, by
stating the importance of the clear and convincing evidence standard as a way to circumvent nonadversarial attorney ad litem proceedings); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995) (stating that the clear
and convincing standard is purely evidentiary and applies to all decisions regarding termination of
treatment).
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interest in refusing treatment and determined that the clear and convincing
evidence standard was constitutional." 0 The Court emphasized the State's
interest in preserving human life by stating, "We do not think a State is
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.""' Nancy's statement to
a former roommate that she would not want to live as a "vegetable" was
not deemed to be clear and convincing evidence that she would have refused treatment.112 Nancy's statements did not specifically refer to the
"withdrawal of medical treatment or of hydration and nutrition."113 Therefore the Court denied the request for the removal of life-support treatment,
despite recognizing "the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment." 14
II.

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

Physician-assisted suicide involves taking tangible steps toward ending a patient's life. 15 Physician-assisted suicide at the specific request of a
patient, however, should not be confused with euthanasia in which third
parties make the decision to hasten a patient's death. Physician-assisted
suicide is sometimes referred to as a form of active euthanasia. 1 6 In some
instances, the physician, at the request of the patient or surrogate decisionmaker, may administer a lethal injection to the patient.11 In other instances
a physician merely supplies the patient with the means or information necessary to commit suicide on her own.118 This latter method requires the
patient to administer a death-inducing act or drug herself. 19 The right of a
mentally competent person to kill herself with a physician's assistance is
highly controversial. 2 °
The first legislation regarding physician-assisted suicide was introduced in the Ohio Legislature in 1906.121 The bill authorized an adult of
110 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
111 Id. According to the Court, a "[s]tate has more particular interests at stake." Id. at 281.
112 Id. at 285.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 278.
115 See Gifford, supra note 71, at 1546 n.3; see also People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714
(Mich. 1994); In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Mark Strasser, Assisted Suicide and the Competent
Terminally Ill: On OrdinaryTreatments and ExtraordinaryPolicies,74 OR. L. REV. 539, 557 (1995);
Mark D. Frederick, Comment, PhysicianAssisted Suicide: A PersonalRight?, 21 S.U. L. REV. 59, 64
(1994).
116 See generally Gifford, supra note 71, at 1546 (defining active euthanasia by lethal injection).
117 See id.
118 See England, supra note 71, at 360.
119 See id.
120 See Charles J. Dougherty, The Common Good, Terminal Illness, and Euthanasia,9 ISSUES IN
L & MED. 151, 163 (1993).
121 See Tsarouhas, supranote 12, at 796.
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sound mind to seek assisted suicide, provided that the adult had suffered a
fatal injury or had contracted a terminal illness. The statute required that
the physician ask the patient if he wished to terminate his life in the presence of three witnesses. If the patient answered yes, the statute required the
patient to consult three other physicians. If the physicians agreed that the
patient's condition was incurable, then the patient was eligible for assisted
suicide.122 The Ohio Legislature defeated the bill in a 78-to-22 vote. 123
Since the early 1900s there have been periodical attempts to pass legislation permitting assisted suicide, but most attempts have been unsuccessful.124 In 1980, Derek Humphry established the Hemlock Society, after
helping his wife end her life when she was suffering from terminal
cancer. 125 The Society was created to promote the legalization of physician-assisted suicide, but has had little success.126 Other attempts to introduce assisted suicide legislation have also largely failed. Americans
Against Human Sufferings, an affiliate of the Hemlock Society, campaigned to submit an euthanasia initiative on the California ballot, but
failed to obtain enough signatures. 27
In 1991, Citizens for Death with Dignity sponsored a statewide Death
With Dignity Initiative in Washington state.'22 The campaign faced substantial political opposition.22 The Roman Catholic Church opposed the
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id. In 1937, an euthanasia bill was introduced into the Nebraska legislature. In 1939, the
Euthanasia Society introduced a euthanasia bill in New York, but it was not considered by the New
York Legislature. Significant efforts to pass euthanasia legislation in New York in 1947 and 1952
failed. Idaho, Oregon, and Montana legislatures discussed euthanasia between 1969 and 1974. See id.
at 796-97.
125 See id. at 797 ("Following the tragedy of his wife's death, Derek Humphry is devoted to
research, writing and educating the public on active euthanasia. He is no longer the executive officer of
The Hemlock Society; he is now the founder and head of the Euthanasia Research and Guidance Organization.").
126 See id.
127 See David R. Schanker, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation, and the Health Care
Crisis,68 IND. L.J. 977, 1000 (1993).
128 See id. Schanker notes that:
Initiative 119 was a proposal to amend Washington's Natural Death Act, a living
wills statute, to accommodate voluntary euthanasia or "physician aid-in-dying" as
it was called in the initiative. Only competent patients with six months or less to
live (in the written opinion of two examining physicians) would be eligible for
aid-in-dying, which must be requested solely by the patient in the presence of two
disinterested witnesses. An aid-in-dying directive could only be executed at the
time euthanasia was requested, not in advance. In addition, no physician would be
compelled to provide aid-in-dying; physicians who object to the practice would be
obliged only to make a good faith effort to transfer the patient to a physician who
would perform the service. Other provisions were designed to allow the patient to
prevoke the directive at any time, to ensure that life insurance is not impaired, and
to provide criminal penalties for interference with a directive or the revocation of
a directive.
Id. at 1000-01 (footnotes omitted).
129 See David J. Garrow, Nine Justices anda Funeral,GEORGE, June 1997, at 56, 59.
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initiative and launched a campaign to defeat it at the polls. 3 ° The church
ran television ads "featuring nurses who declared they didn't want to have
to kill their patients."'' The initiative was defeated, fifty-four percent to
forty-six percent.' 32 At the time, this was the closest any euthanasia legislation had ever come to enactment.
Following losing in Washington, Ralph Mero of the Hemlock Society
launched Compassion in Dying. 33 The group counsels patients wishing to
end their lives.' 3 4 Realizing that such counseling techniques may leave
doctors subject to prosecution, Mero decided to challenge the constitutionality of Washington's law against physician-assisted suicide, rather than
in the Suwaiting for possible prosecution.' 35 This challenge culminated
36
preme Court's decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.'
The defeat of Washington's Death With Dignity Initiative did not
stop the political campaigns for physician-assisted suicide. In 1992, euthanasia bills were introduced in Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire.137 New Hampshire took a novel approach in its Death with Dignity
Act, which proposes that a patient wishing to terminate his life, may be
examined by two physicians. When it is determined that the patient is terminally ill, the attending physician may dispense a legal prescription. The
the medication at the time, place, and
patient may then self 1administer
38
manner he so chooses.
Currently, Oregon is the only state that has passed legislation permit130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id. Mero was approached by attorney Kathryn Tucker who advised he take a proactive
legal approach rather than wait until being prosecuted for his end of life counseling.
136 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
137 See Schanker, supra note 127, 1002. According to Schanker,
The Iowa and Maine bills closely track Proposition 161. The Michigan bill contains a number of innovative safeguards. First the directive must be certified
within seven days of execution by a psychologist or psychiatrist, attesting that the
patient is of sound mind and not suffering from depression. Second, the attending
physician must have attended the patient for at least six months. Third, the patient
must be determined to be suffering from both a terminal illness and physical pain
so great that its elimination would render the patient unconscious. Fourth, sixty
days must pass between the execution of the directive and the euthanasia, and the
patient must request euthanasia at least twice, with seven days between each request. Fifth, each request must be videotaped and witnessed by two individuals,
and the performance of euthanasia must also be videotaped. Finally, the decision
for the attending physician to administer euthanasia must be reviewed and approved by at least two members of a three-member committee appointed by the
county medical examiner or the administrator of the health facility where the patient is dying. This complex and unwieldy procedure was criticized by both proand anti-euthanasia forces. Kevorkian commented, "You don't have a law telling
doctors how to perform gallbladder operations or other surgeries."
Id. at 1002-03 (footnotes omitted).
138 See id. at 1003.
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ting physician-assisted suicide. 3 9 Oregon's Measure 16, the Death With

Dignity Act, was passed in November 1994 and is now in effect despite
legal challenges from anti-assisted-suicide activists'40 The act permits
terminally ill adults residing in Oregon, to obtain a lethal prescription from
an Oregon physician. 141
111. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE COURTS

Although a competent person's right to withdraw or withhold medical
life support treatment has been upheld for years, courts have been unwilling to grant patients' requests for physician assistance. 142 Currently, most
states prohibit by statute physician-assisted suicide.' 4 3 In 1997, the Supreme Court heard two challenges to state laws prohibiting physicianassisted suicide. In both Vacco v. Quill'44 and Washington v.
Glucksberg,145 the Court rejected claims that the Constitution protects a
right to die that encompasses physician-assisted suicide.
Some right-to-die advocates maintain that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment should include the right to die with physician
assistance. 16 Others argue that state statutes prohibiting physician-assisted
139 See Garrow, supra note 129, at 62. Oregon's Death With Dignity law is codified at OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.810-897 (1997).
140 See Garrow, supra note 129, at 61 ("James Bopp, Jr., . . . filed suit in federal court ... on
behalf of several terminally ill individuals and a half dozen Oregon health care providers who professed that implementation of the new law would make them and their patients vulnerable to undue
coercion.").
141 See id. Garrow discussed the requirements:
The patient has to make such a request on three different occasions, separated by
at least one 15-day waiting period. One of the requests must be in writing and endorsed by two witnesses, at least one of whom cannot be a relative or an heir. A
second physician must confirm both the terminal diagnosis and the voluntariness
of the patient's request; in any case involving possible depression, psychologist or
psychiatrist must certify that the patient is not suffering from any mental disorder
before a prescription can be provided.
Id.
142 See id.
143 These state statutes include: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(3) (West 1989) (manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988) (separate crime, felony); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3104 (1)(b) (West 1990) (manslaughter); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992) (separate crime,
felony); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31 (West Supp. 1998) (separate crime, felony if the suicide
was successful, misdemeanor if suicide is unsuccessful); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023(1), (2) (1992)
(felony); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1994) ("[It is a felony] if the actor's conduct causes such
suicide or an attempted suicide. Otherwise it is a misdemeanor."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-6 (West
1994) (separate crime, felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1997) (separate crime, felony);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if suicide is unsuccessful); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (separate crime,
felony). For a more complete listing of state statutes, see Stansbury, supranote 71, at 637 & n.132.
144 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
145 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
146 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
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suicide violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the statutes give some patients the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, while they deny other patients the right to die with physician assistance."' In Glucksberg and Vacco, the Supreme Court rejected
each of these arguments. This article argues that the right to die with physician assistance is better protected under the Ninth Amendment than
through due process or equal protection. The Ninth Amendment explicitly
recognizes the existence of unenumerated rights under the constitution.
Thus, the Ninth Amendment is the most logical basis for protecting fundamental, albeit unenumerated, rights, such as the right to choose how and
when one dies.
A.

48
Due Process and Washington v. Glucksberg

The "due process," or "liberty" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
permits states to deprive people of their liberty interests as long as it is
done with the procedural safeguards of due process. The due process
clause has a long history of judicial abuse. In Lochner v. New York,' 49 the
Supreme Court struck down a state statute, which limited hazardous employment to 60 hours a week on the dubious legal theory that the statute
deprived an employee's "liberty" to work until he dropped. 50 Indeed, by
the mid 1960's the courts had abused the concept of "substantive due pro15
cess" to the point that when the Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut, 1
it would not declare that married citizens had a fundamental right to practice contraception under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 52 In Griswold, the Court held that Connecticut's law banning the
Due Process Clause "holds that the Constitution's guarantee of 'due process of law' requires that
statutes not infringe on rights, like privacy, not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights." Garrett
Epps, Judges Who Support the Right to Die, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Jan. 13, 1997, at 28, 30.
According to the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection of the laws cannot be denied by any
State to any person within its jurisdiction. "This constitutional guarantee simply requires the states to
treat in a similar manner all individuals who are similarly situated." Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 725
(2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997).
147 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 716.
148 This case began as Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh 'g en banc granted by 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd on
reh 'g en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997), but, to avoid confusion, the case is referred to as Glucksberg throughout this discussion.
149 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
150 See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see also Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587 (1936). It took the high-handed threat of President Franklin Roosevelt to pack the Supreme Court
with additional justices to induce the "switch in time that saved nine" in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937). This decision brought the "Lochner era" to a merciful end.
151 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
152 The relevant part of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus the "liberty" clause and "due process" clause are one and the same, although the connection between the two
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use of contraceptives unconstitutionally invaded marital privacy.1 53 The
Court struck the statute on finding a right to privacy among the "penumbra" of various constitutional guarantees that are not expressly stated in the
Bill of Rights. For instance, the court found that "the First Amendment has
154
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion."
The Court explained that there are some rights not expressly stated in
the First Amendment, but are "necessary in making the express guarantees
fully meaningful.' 55 Accordingly, the rights to freedom of speech and
press are not limited to the right to speak or print, but also include the right
to distribute, receive, and read. 156 The First Amendment protects the freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and right to teach. 157 The Griswold
Court relied on an earlier precedent, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,158 for the proposition that the "freedom to associate and privacy
in one's associations," is a peripheral right of the First Amendment, even
159
though it is not expressly protected.
In addition to the First Amendment, the Court relied on other components of the Bill of Rights to establish a right to privacy." The Third and
Fourth Amendments protect against all "governmental invasions 'of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." 161 The Fifth Amendment allows a person to create a "zone of privacy" prohibiting the government from forcing self-incrimination. 162 Based on these "penumbral"
constitutional guarantees, the Court determined that marriage created a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy that state governments could not
is rarely made explicit.
153 In striking down the Connecticut statute the Court inquired, "Would we allow the police to
search the sacred bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. Griswold,
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, was arrested for giving married
couples information, advice, and instruction about birth control. See id. at 480. The statute Griswold
allegedly violated stated: "Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another
to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principle offender." Id. (quotation omitted).
154 Id. at 483. See Stansbury, supranote 71, at 624.
155 Id. The Court in Griswold, used the right to associate as an example.
156 Id. at 482 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
157 Id. (construing Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)).
158 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the disclosure of membership lists of a valid association
restrained a member's right to freedom of association).
159 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (quoting Patterson,357 U.S. at 462).
160

See id. at 484-85.

161 Id. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). The Third Amendment
prohibits the quartering of soldiers in a person's home in a time of peace without their consent. U.S.
CONST. amend. III. "The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."' Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484.
162 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The Court also noted that the Ninth Amendment states that the
enumerated rights in the Constitution "shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." Id. at 485 (citing U.S. CONST. amend IX).

1999]

THE RIGHT TO DIE AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT

163
violate by prohibiting the use of contraception.
The Supreme Court expanded Griswold's right to privacy in the
landmark abortion case Roe v. Wade. " The Court held a Texas statute that
criminalized abortion unconstitutional because it interfered with a
woman's right to choose whether to continue her pregnancy.' 65 As in
Griswold, the Court did not rely on the due process clause to protect this
right. Instead, the Court discussed in vague terms the "concept of liberty"
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reiterated the protected right to privacy and stated that although "[t]he Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy.. . the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.' 66 The personal right to privacy
was "deemed 'fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
only a "compelling state interest" could justify infringliberty."",167 Thus,
16 8
ing upon it.
In Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, the Court revisited the abortion is1
sue. 69 While the Court upheld state imposed restrictions upon the right to
terminate a pregnancy, it reaffirmed the right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause. The Court stated that "the Constitution places limits on a
State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family
and parenthood ... as well as bodily integrity."' 7' The Court noted, "At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' 17 1 The Court
held that a person's ability to define these beliefs cannot be accomplished
through compulsion of the state.1 72 Recalling Eisenstadtv. Baird,the Court
recognized "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child., 173 State
regulations are permissible, so long as they do not impose an "undue burden" on the protected liberty interest. 174 "A finding of an undue burden is

163

id. at 485-86.

164 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Stansbury, supra note 71, at 624. Although the
Court expanded the right to privacy to include abortion in Roe, it was unwilling to expand it further to
include the right to engage in consensual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
165 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
166

Id. at 152.

167 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
168 Id. at 155. To serve state interests the Court established the trimester system which allowed
the state to regulate or even prohibit abortion in the second trimester if the fetus was viable or maternal
health was at issue. See id. at 160-63.
169 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
170 Id. at 849.
171 Id. at 851.
172

Id.

173 Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
174

See id. at 877.
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shorthand for concluding that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle" in the way of exercising the protected liberty interest. 75 In Planned Parenthood, the Court held that state regulations designed to inform the woman or persuade her to choose childbirth
17 6
over abortion are not considered unduly burdensome.
Although Griswold, in part, relied upon the Ninth Amendment to
establish the constitutional right to privacy, many proponents of the right
to physician-assisted suicide as a protected liberty interest look to the Due
Process Clause to protect that right. 77 The Supreme Court, however, refused to extend due process protection to physician-assisted suicide the
way it was extended to cover procreation and other rights.
1.

Background

The plaintiffs in Glucksberg consisted of three terminally ill patients,
five treating physicians, and Compassion in Dying. 78 The three patients,
Jane Roe, John Doe and James Poe, were terminally ill suffering from cancer, AIDS, and emphysema. 179 The patients were mentally competent
80
adults who wished to hasten their deaths by physician-prescribed drugs. 1
Jane Roe, who suffered from cancer, had a life expectancy of six
months. 181 She suffered from "swollen legs, bed sores, poor appetite, nausea and vomiting, impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and general
weakness," and constant sharp pain. 182 She had exhausted all forms of
183
medical treatment but took medication, which did not alleviate her pain.
John Doe, an artist dying of AIDS, suffered severe "bouts of pneumonia, chronic, severe skin and sinus infections, grand mal seizures, ex175 Id.
176 Id. at 878.

177 See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 71.
178 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd,
49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc grantedby 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), affd on reh'g en banc,
79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). Compassion in Dying is non-profit organization that provides free information, counseling and assistance to
mentally incompetent, terminally ill patients considering suicide. The organization has strict eligibility
requirements that a patient must meet before providing assistance. These requirements are: (1) the
patient must be considered terminally ill; (2) the patient must be capable of making and understanding
her own decisions; (3) a mental health professional must evaluate the patient; (4) the motivation for
assisted suicide must not be based on inadequate comfort or care, lack of health insurance, or other
financial problems. In addition, the patient must request Compassion in Dying's assistance in writing
at least three times, with 48-hour intervals between each request. Finally, immediate family members
must approve the decision. See id. at 1458.
179 The patients in this case chose to use pseudonyms for their names for privacy. Two plaintiffs,
Jane Roe and John Doe, died before the district court issued its opinion. See id. at 1456.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 Id.

183

See id.
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treme fatigue," and a seventy percent loss of vision.184 He was mentally
worsen.' 85 He wished to
competent and understood that his disease could
86
hasten his death by physician-prescribed drugs.
James Poe suffered from chronic emphysema, which caused him "a
constant sensation of suffocating."1' 87 He was reduced to regular doses of
morphine to alleviate the suffocating sensation. 8 8 No cure existed for his
cardiac and pulmonary diseases. He was diagnosed as being in the final
mentally competent and requested
phase of the illness. 189 Mr. Poe was
1 90
physician-assisted suicide by drugs.
The five physician-plaintiffs all regularly treated terminally ill patients. 19 1 Doctors Harold Glucksberg, John Geyman, Abigail Halperin, and
Peter Shalit were professors or instructors at the University of Washington
School of Medicine. 192 Dr. Thomas Preston was the chief of the cardiology
unit at Pacific Medical Center in Seattle. 93 All believed that physicianassisted suicide should be legal. According to Dr. Glucksberg, a terminal
cancer patient is "usually bedridden, rapidly losing mental and physical
functions, often in excruciating, unrelenting pain.' ' 194 Many terminally ill
patients "experience prolonged deaths often involving pain, suffering, and
loss of dignity."' 195 On several occasions, the doctors' professional judgment dictated that they assist patients to end their lives, but all five doctors
claimed that the Washington statute banning physician assisted suicide
deterred them from helping their patients. 9 6
2.

District Court Decision

Glucksberg was first heard in the Western District of Washington by
Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein. 9 7 The district court granted summary

judgment for the plaintiffs and held that the Washington statute prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide unconstitutionally violated the liberty interests
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-

184

Id.

See id.
See id. at 1457.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1457-58.
See id. at 1458.
Id. at 1457.
Id. Therefore, many patients want more control over their lives during the final stages of the
illness. See id.
196 See id. at 1458.
197 See id. at 1454.
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
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teenth Amendment.198
The court ruled that "[t]he liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is the freedom to make choices according to one's individual
conscience about those matters which are essential to personal autonomy
99
and basic human dignity."'
The court relied on Planned Parenthoodv. Casey2°° to support physician-assisted suicide as a protected liberty interest. The district court compared abortion and assisted suicide by noting that:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could 1not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
20
compulsion of the State.

The court reasoned that "[1]ike the abortion decision, the decision of a terminally ill person to end his or her life 'involv[es] the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime' and constitutes a
'choice[] central to personal dignity and autonomy. ,'202
The district court applied the undue burden standard set forth in Casey to evaluate the constitutionality of the Washington statute.2 °3 Applying
the undue burden standard requires examining the state interests and determining whether the statute substantially burdens the individual's
rights. 2' The State argued that it had a legitimate interest in preventing
suicide, but the court reasoned that this interest was not compelling where,
as in this case, the patients were terminally ill and in great pain. 2 5 The
State also argued that the statute had a legitimate purpose in preventing
undue influence and abuse, but the court rejected this argument as well
because the patients were mentally competent when they requested physi198 See id. The Washington statute in question stated: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. Promoting a suicide is a
class C felony punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five years and a fine of up to ten thousand dollars." Id. at 1458-59 (quotations omitted). Washington does not have a law prohibiting suicide
or attempted suicide. See id. at 1458.
199
200

Id. at 1461.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).

201

Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (alteration in

Compassion in Dying).

202 Id. at 1459-60 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). The district court also found support in
Cruzan which found a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right of a terminally ill patient to
refuse or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. See id. at 1461 (discussing Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
203 See id. at 1462 ("'A burden may be 'undue' either because the burden is too severe or because
it lacks a legitimate, rational justification."' (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 920)).
204 See id. at 1464.

205

See id.
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cian-assisted suicide.20 6 Therefore, the district court concluded that the
statute placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a terminally ill patient's
right to choose physician assisted suicide without a sufficiently compelling
20 7
state interest.
3.

Ninth Circuit Decisions

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision, rejecting the district court's reasoning on several
counts. 2 0 First, the Ninth Circuit panel found that the district court took
the language from Casey out of context. 2 ' The district court's attempt to
link the right of a terminally ill person to the "personal dignity and autonomy" and "the right to define one's own concept of existence" created an
"inherently unstable" category of rights. 210 According to the Ninth Circuit
panel, "[tihe depressed twenty-one year old, the romantically-devastated
twenty-eight year old, the alcoholic forty-year-old who chose suicide are
also expressing their views of the existence, meaning, the universe, and
life; they are also asserting their personal liberty., 21 ' The right to commit
suicide could not be solely limited to the terminally ill. The Ninth Circuit
explained that "[i]f such a liberty exists in 212
this context ...every man and
woman in the United States must enjoy it."
Additionally, the court found that no precedent existed to support the
notion that physician assisted suicide is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest.1 3 The district court's facial invalidation of the statute was unwarranted.214 Normally, a facial challenge to a statute "must establish that no
206 See id. at 1465. In addition, the court noted that allowing terminally ill patients to refuse or
withdraw medical treatment creates the same potential for abuse, and yet such actions are clearly
protected. See id.
207 Id. at 1465-66. The district court also held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it allowed some terminally ill patients the option of hastening
death by refusing or withdrawing medical treatment, and denied other patients the option to hasten
death with a physician's assistance. According to the court, "Both [sets of patients were] terminally ill,
[suffered] pain and loss of dignity and subjected to a more extended dying process without some medical intervention, be it removal of life support systems or the prescription of medication to be selfadministered." Id. at 1467. The effort to establish a right to physician-assisted suicide under the Equal
Protection Clause is discussed infra Part ILI.B.
208 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted by 62
F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
209 See id. at 590. Judge Noonan criticized the district court by stating: "It is commonly accounted an error to lift sentences or even paragraphs out of one context and insert the abstracted
thought into a wholly different context." Id.
210 Id.; see also Christopher N. Manning, Note, Live and Let Die?: Physician-Assisted Suicide
and the Right to Die, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 513,525 (1996).
211 Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 590-91.
212 Id. at 591.
213 See id.
214 See id.

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 7:2

set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid., 215 The
district court, however, did not even attempt to determine a percentage of
the instances where the statute would be unconstitutional.2 16
The Ninth Circuit also declared that the district court gave insufficient
weight to the state's interests in preventing physician-assisted suicide, including not having physicians portray the "role of killers of their patients,"
"not subjecting the elderly... [or] infirm to psychological pressure to consent to their own deaths," protecting the poor from exploitation, and protecting the handicapped from societal indifference.217 According to the
Court, these state interests outweighed the individual's alleged right to
suicide. 18
The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, and, in an eight to
three decision written by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, reversed the threejudge panel. The en banc opinion focused on two issues. First, the court
recognized a constitutionally protected liberty interest "in controlling the
time and manner of one's death." 219 Second, the court applied a due process balancing test to determine if the statute was unconstitutional.22 °
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Constitution protected a person's right to physician-assisted suicide. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, the court held that "a person's decision whether to endure or avoid such an existence constitutes one of the
most, if not the most, 'intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime,' a choice that is 'central to personal dignity and autonomy. '221
The court likened the liberty interest of allowing a woman to choose to
have an abortion with the liberty interest of protecting a person's right to
physician-assisted suicide. 222 Both matters, according to the court, involve
"the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime"
which are "central to personal dignity and223autonomy [and] . . .the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.,
The court turned to Cruzan to support its holding. The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that because Cruzan recognized a liberty interest in the right to
refuse or withdraw unwanted medical treatment, Cruzan "necessarily recognizes a liberty interest in hastening one's own death.'1 24 Together, Casey and Cruzan persuaded the en banc panel that a liberty interest that
215 Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
216 See id.
217 Id.at592-93.
218

See id.

219

Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997); see also Manning, supra note 210, at 529-30.
220 See Compassion inDying, 79 F.3d at 837; see also Manning, supra note 210, at 530.
221 Id. at 814 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
222 See id.at 813-14.
223

Id. at 813.

224

Id. at 816.
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protects a person's right to control the time and manner of his or her own
death was due constitutional protection.22 5
After establishing that the right to physician-assisted suicide is a protected liberty interest, the Ninth Circuit applied a balancing test to determine whether the statute violated an individual's substantive due process
rights.2 26 First, the court examined the State's interests, such as preserving
life, preventing suicide, avoiding the involvement of third parties, "precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence," "protecting family
members and loved ones," "protecting the integrity of the medical profession," and "avoiding adverse consequences that might ensue if the statutory provision... is declared unconstitutional. 227 The Ninth Circuit did
not find the state interests in preserving life and preventing suicide compelling. Washington's statute allowing a terminally ill person to refuse or
withdraw life support treatment contradicted the state's argument that human life must be preserved in all cases.228 Although the court recognized
the state's legitimate interest in preventing suicide, this interest is severely
diminished regarding the terminally ill. 229 Terminally ill patients are not
cutting their lives short, but are suffering in the last stages of their lives.23 °
Thus, the court found the state's interests to be outweighed by the liberty
interests at stake. In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that the decision to end
one's life is so "painful, delicate, personal, important,
[and] final" that a
23 1
interest.
liberty
that
prohibit
cannot
state's interests
4.

Supreme Court Decision

In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc
decision.2 32 The Court ruled that the Washington statute did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and that states are free to prohibit physicianassisted suicide.2 33 The Court's analysis comprised three tiers: a historical
225 See id.
226 See id. The balancing test factors include:
(1) the importance of the various state interests, both in general and in the factual
context of the case; (2) the manner in which those interests are furthered by the
state law or regulation; (3) the importance of the liberty interest, both in itself and
in the context in which it is being exercised; (4) the extent to which that interest is
burdened by the challenged state action; and (5) the consequences of upholding or
overturning the statute or regulation.
Id.
227

Id. at 816-17.

228 See id. at 817.
229 See id. at 820-21.
230 See id. The court also recognized the state's interests in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession. See id. at 823.
231 Id. at 837; see also Stansbury, supra note 71, at 635.
232 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
233 See id. The Washington Statute reads: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt
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backdrop of suicide and assisted suicide, a Due Process analysis, and an
analysis of legitimate governmental interests.
The Court examined the historical and legal traditions and practices
of suicide and assisted suicide which "provide the crucial 'guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking.' 23 4 Anglo-American common law has denounced suicide and assisted suicide for over 700 years.235 The American
colonies adopted similar practices. 236 Harsh punishment for committing
suicide was eventually abandoned, but suicide was still condemned.2 37 "By
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was a crime in most
states to assist a suicide. 238
Against this historical backdrop, the Court addressed the issue of
whether assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court emphasized that the Due Process Clause has traditionally protected those rights which are "deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition. '239 The Court explained that the due process clause
protects such liberties as the right to marry, have children, direct a child's
education, marital privacy, the use of conception, bodily integrity, abortion, and the right to refuse medical treatment. 2' According to the Court,
"the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe . . . 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 24 ' But the court did not recognize the right to physician-assisted suicide as a "fundamental" liberty interest.
The patients, physicians, and Compassion in Dying characterized the
liberty interest at stake as the right to "control one's final days" and "to
choose how to die., 242 In response, the Court emphasized that Cruzan was
not a "right to die case" but a case which allowed a person the right to refwhen he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." WASH REV. CODE §
9A.36.060(1) (1988).
234 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992));
see also supra Parts I.A, B.
235 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263.
236

See id. at 2264.

237 See id.
238

Id. at 2265.

239 Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). Justice Souter,
relying on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, would rather have determined "whether [Washington's] statute sets up one of those 'arbitrary impositions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the
Due Process Clause." Id.(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
The Court, however, noted that the traditional due process analysis was never abandoned and was
applied in recent cases. See id. at 2268 n.17. "[B]y establishing a threshold requirement--that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to
a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex balancing of competing
interests in every case." Id.
240 See id. at 2267 (citations omitted).
241 Id. at 2268 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
242 Id. at 2269 (citation omitted).
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use medical treatment.24 3 Therefore, the Court defined the issue as whether
a person has a protected right to commit suicide. 2"
The Court decided that protecting physician-assisted suicide would
force the Court to "reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and
strike down the considered policy of choice of almost every State. 245
However, respondents argued that such liberties are historically and traditionally consistent by pointing to Cruzan and Casey as examples of "selfsovereignty" in which the individual exercises control over personal decisions. 246
The Court first addressed Cruzan and distinguished the removal or
refusal of medical treatment from assisted suicide.24 7 Under the common
law, forced medication constitutes a battery.248 The Court went on to conclude that "[t]he decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another
may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. 24 9
Second, the Court addressed Casey. The Court explained that "many
of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in
personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and
all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected. ' 250 The
Court concluded that assisted suicide has been historically rejected and
will remain unprotected by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5'
The constitutional inquiry does not end there. In order to uphold
Washington's statute banning assisted suicide, the statute must be "rationally related to legitimate government interests., 252 The Court recognized
five state interests. 3 First, the State has a legitimate interest in the preservation of human life.254 The Court compared the statute banning assisted
suicide to homicide laws: "[T]he interests in the sanctity of life that are
represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another., 255 The
243

Id.

244 See id.
245 Id. The Court recognized that "if a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." Id. (quoting Flores,507
U.S. at 303).
246 Id. (quotation omitted).
247 See id. at 2269-70.
248 See id.
249

Id. at 2270.

250 Id. at 2271 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973)).
251 See id. at 2271-72.
252 Id. at 2271 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
305 (1990)).
253 See id. at 2272 n.20. The Court identified a state interest of "protecting family members and
loved ones" although this sixth interest was not discussed in the text of the opinion. Id.
254 See id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)).
255 Id. at 2265 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt.5 (1980)).
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patients, physicians and Compassion in Dying, and the Court of Appeals
maintained that the state's interest in preserving life only extends to people
who are not near death and "who can still contribute to society and enjoy
life. '' 256 The Court responded by stating that the States "'may properly
decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular indi215 7
vidual may enjoy' ... even for those who are near death.
Second, the Court recognized the State's legitimate interest in preventing suicide.258 Specifically, the State has an interest in studying suicide
to identify and treat its causes since it is considered a "serious public
health problem., 25 9 Most people who attempt suicide are severely depressed or suffer mental disorders.260 The Court emphasized that most
people who request physician-assisted suicide change their minds when
their depression and pain are treated. 261' Legalizing physician assisted suicide would hinder physicians' abilities to treat depression and pain.26 2 The
State would no longer be able to protect the mentally ill and depressed.263
Third, the State has an interest in "protecting the integrity and ethics
of the medical profession. ' ' 264 The Court referred to the American Medical
Association Code of Ethics, which stated that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide
is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer. '265 The
doctor-patient relationship based on trust and the doctor's ability to heal,
not harm, would be drastically diminished.266
Fourth, "the State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groupsincluding the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect,
and mistakes. 267 The Court feared that many terminally ill people would
turn to physician-assisted suicide in order to spare their families the medical expenses. 268
Fifth, "the State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it

256 Id. at 2272 (quotation omitted). The Court of Appeals "held that the 'weight' of this interest
depends on the medical condition and the wishes of the person whose life is at stake." Id.
257 Id. (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282).
258

See id.

259 Id. ("The state recognizes suicide as a manifestation of medical and psychological anguish."
(quotation omitted)).
260 See id. The Court referred to the New York Task Force on Life and Law which stated that
ninety-five percent of people who commit suicide suffered from a mental illness. See id.
261 See id. at 2273.
262

See id.

263

See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting CODE OF ETHICS § 2.211 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1994)).

264

265
266
267

See id.

Id.
268 See id. According to the New York Task Force, "[t]he risk of harm is greatest for the many
individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack
of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group." Id.
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down the path to voluntary and perhaps involuntary euthanasia., 269 The
Court was concerned that the Court of Appeals' "limited right to physician-assisted suicide" would be actually a much broader right not limited
to the terminally ill. If assisted suicide becomes a constitutionally pro270
tected right, "every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it.
The Court referred to the Netherlands where the legalization of physician2 71
assisted suicide has allegedly led cases of nonconsensual euthanasia.
The Court found that these state interests were compelling and served
legitimate ends. Therefore, the Court did not have to balance the strengths
of these interests against the burden placed on the individual.272 The Court
held that the Washington statute banning physician assisted suicide did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether physician-assisted suicide
should be legal is a question that is best left to the states. 3
B.

Equal Protectionand Vacco v. Quill

The Due Process Clause is not the only source of constitutional protection asserted on behalf of a right to physician-assisted suicide. Fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy, have also been protected by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute, which permitted married couples to obtain contraceptives to prevent
pregnancy, but prohibited single persons from doing the same. 274 The
Equal Protection Clause denies states "the power to legislate that different
treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes
on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. ,275
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia held that miscegenation statutes prohibiting interracial marriages violated the Equal Protec269 Id.
270 Id. (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc
granted by 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), affid on reh'g en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub

nom Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)).
271 See id. at 2274-75.
272 See id.
273 See id. The Court specified that the Statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment "as
applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their death by obtaining medication
prescribed by their doctors." Id. (quotation omitted).
274 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The statute in question made it a felony for anyone
to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception except in the case
of (1) a registered physician administering or prescribing it for a married person or (2) an active registered pharmacist furnishing it to a married person presenting a registered physician's prescription. See
id. at 441.
275 Id. at 447 ("A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstances shall be treated alike."' (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920))). The Court did state that the Equal Protection Clause "does not deny the State
the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways." Id. at 446-47 (citation omitted).
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tion Clause. 276 The Court considered the right to marry whomever one
chooses to be a personal right unrestricted by the state.277 The Court further stated: "Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
upon by the State."27' 8
A person's right to die is considered by many a personal right that
should be afforded constitutional protection. Some right to die advocates
argue that prohibiting physician assisted suicide violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing terminally ill patients to withdraw or withhold life support treatment, but denying other
patients the right to die with physician assistance.27 9 The Court addressed
this argument in Glucksberg,280 but focused on the Equal Protection Clause
in Quill v. Vacco.
1.

Background

The original plaintiffs in Vacco were three physicians and three terminally ill patients seeking physician-assisted suicide. 281 As in Glucksberg, however, the patients died before the case was resolved. The physicians contended that they should be able to prescribe medication to hasten
a patient's death if that is what their patient desired.2 82 A New York statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, however, prevented the physicians
from assisting patients hasten their deaths.28 3
The physicians argued that the New York statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because a patient's right
to refuse or withdraw unwanted medical treatment is "essentially the same
276 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
277 Id. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted
by invidious racial discriminations. See id.
278 Id.
279 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); see also
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990); Robert L. Kline, The Right to
Assisted Suicide in Washington and Oregon: The Courts Won't Allow a Northwest Passage,B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 213, 216 (1996).
280 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1465-67 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc grantedby 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), affd on reh'g en
banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nonm Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
281 Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). The three physicians were Timothy E. Quill, Samuel
C. Klagsbrun, and Howard A. Grossman. The patients were William A. Barth, George A. Kingsley,
and Jane Doe. See id. at 79.
282 See id. at 80-81.
283 Id. Section 125.15(3) of the N.Y. Penal Law reads: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree when: . . . He intentionally aids person to commit suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.15(3) (McKinney 1987). Section 120.30 reads, in pertinent part: "A person guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt when he intentionally ... aids another person to attempt suicide." Id. § 120.30. Violation of either statute is a felony.
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thing" as the right to physician assisted suicide. 284 Therefore, they contended, terminally ill patients are treated differently under the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2 85
2.

Lower Court Decisions

The federal district court rejected the physicians' claims and held that
the distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the withdrawal of
medical treatment had a "reasonable and rational basis., 286 The court ruled
that the state has legitimate interests in "preserving life, and in protecting
vulnerable persons," and that "it is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the
State to recognize a difference between allowing nature to take its course.
. . and intentionally using an artificial death-producing device., 28 7 Therefore, the court ruled, the New York statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court,
striking down New York's statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide
under the Equal Protection clause.288 The law "does not treat equally all
competent persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to
hasten their deaths," the court noted.289 The court held that terminally ill
patients seeking to withhold or withdraw life support treatment were
members of a similarly situated group as patients seeking physician assisted suicide. Therefore, New York law must treat all patients with terminal illnesses that wish to "hasten their deaths" equally, regardless of
whether they request physician-assisted suicide or request medical treatment removed, unless a compelling state interest could justify the disparate
treatment.29 °
The Second Circuit then examined whether the unequal treatment
served some legitimate state interest, such as the preservation of human
life.29 ' "What concern prompts the state to interfere with a mentally competent patient's 'right to define [his] own concept of existence, of mean284
285

Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84.
See id. In contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Kevorkian deliberately chose not

to address a similar Equal Protection Clause argument that a Michigan statute prohibiting assisted
suicide was unconstitutional. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 732 (Mich. 1994). The Kevorkian
court here reasoned that the patients seeking assisted suicide were members of a class completely
different from the class of patients choosing to refuse or withdraw medical treatment. Since the classes
of people were different, the Equal Protection Clause was not violated. See id
286 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970)).
287 Id.
288 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
289 Id. at 727.
290 Id. at 730-31. "It simply cannot be said that those mentally competent, terminally-ill persons
who seek to hasten death but whose treatment does not include life support are treated equally." Id. at

729.
291

See id.
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ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life?"' the court asked.2 92
The court found that the State's interest in maintaining the distinction was
not compelling because the interest required the "prolongation of a life that
was all but ended" and it is not within the state's interest to "require the
93
continuation of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable.
3.

Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court heard New York's appeal of Vacco v. Quill" on
the same day it heard Glucksberg, and handed down both decisions on
June 26, 1997. In Vacco, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision
striking down the New York statute prohibiting physician assisted
suicide. 29 5 The Court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that New York's reasons
for the statute advanced legitimate state interests.296 It found the Equal
Protection case against state prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide no
more compelling than the Due Process arguments rejected in Glucksberg.
The Court strongly disagreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion
that withdrawing life support systems "is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide."297 The Court stated "we think the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal
traditions, is both important and logical; it is certainly rational., 298 The
Court emphasized that this "distinction comports with fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent. '299 The Court went on to explain that
"when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication." 300 A
physician who withdraws life-sustaining treatment at a patient's request is

292

Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (alteration by Quill

court)).
293 Id. at 729-30.
294 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997).
295

Id.

296 See id.
297

Id. at 2297.

298 Id. at 2298 (footnote omitted).
299

Id.

300 Id. (citing People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994)); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985) (noting that when feeding tube is removed, death "result[s] ... from [the patient's] underlying medical condition"); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) ("[D]eath which
occurs after the removal of life sustaining systems is from natural causes."); John Glasson, Report of
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association: Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 10 ISSUES INL. & MED. 91, 93 (1994) ("When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the
patient dies primarily because of an underlying disease.")).
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merely honoring that patient's wish.3 ° 1 On the other hand, a physician who
assists a suicide "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that
the patient be made dead., 30 2 In addition, a patient who refuses medical
treatment may not wish to die, but only to be free of medical equipment
and drugs.303 The Court emphasized these distinctions because "[t]he law
has long used actors' intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that
may have the same result."30 4
The Court pointed out that many state courts recognized the distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the withdrawal of medical
treatment, and that "the overwhelming majority of state legislatures" had
codified this distinction into law. 3 5 In the case of New York, physicianassisted suicide was outlawed in 1965, but the state continued to recognize
"patients' common law right to refuse treatment. "306
The Court concluded that the distinction between physician assisted
suicide and the withdrawal or refusal of life sustaining medical treatment
is not "arbitrary and irrational: ' 3 7 "Logic and contemporary practice support New York's judgment that the two acts are different, and New York
may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them differently. 30 8
Finally, the Court also concluded that the New York statute fulfilled
legitimate state interests, including "prohibiting intentional killing and
preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their
patients' healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and
These interests "satisfy
avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia."
the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a ra301 See id. A physician intends "only to respect his patient's wishes and 'to cease doing useless
and futile or degrading things to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to benefit from them."'
Id. (quoting EthicalIssues in Assisted Suicide, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 368 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).
302 Id. at 2299 (quoting Ethical Issues in Assisted Suicide, Hearing before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R.
Kass)).
303 See id. (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224; Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n. 11(Mass. 1977) ("[fln refusing treatment the patient may not have
the specific intent to die ....)).
304 Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-06 (1980)); see Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405
("[T]he... common law of homicide often distinguishes.., between a person who knows that another
person will be killed as the result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of
taking another's life.").
305 Id. at 2299 n.8, 2300. The Court listed the various state statutes in a footnote. See id. at 2301
n.9.
306 Id. at 2301 ("The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law studied assisted suicide
and euthanasia and... unanimously recommended against legalization.").
307 Id. The Court was responding directly to respondents' argument that the distinction was
"arbitrary and irrational." Id. (quotation omitted).
308 Id. at 2302 ("By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment while prohibiting
anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a longstanding and rational distinction.").
309 Id.
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tional relation to some legitimate end."31
While the right to physician-assisted suicide should be constitutionally protected, the reasoning in Vacco is sound. The Court correctly recognized that the Equal Protection Clause "creates no substantive rights," 3 "
and noted that "neither New York's ban on assisting suicide nor its statutes
permitting patients to refuse medical treatment treat anyone differently
than anyone else or draw any distinctions between persons."3'12 Even if the
Fourteenth Amendment does not protect such a right under current Constitutional interpretations, however, the Ninth Amendment supports protecting the right to physician-assisted suicide.
IV. THE NINTH AMENDMENT
A.

Purpose of the Ninth Amendment

It is often asserted that the fundamental rights of American citizens
are derived from the U.S. Constitution, and in particular from the Bill of
Rights. The Framers of the Constitution viewed the origin of fundamental
rights quite differently, however. The Declaration of Independence stated
that the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are endowed not
' The Declaration of
by government, but by the "Creator."313
Independence
was modeled on the Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776, the
first article of which states: "[A]ll Men are by Nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which. . . they cannot, by
any Compact, deprive or divest their Posterity; namely, the Enjoyment of
Life and Liberty ....314
The role of democratic government, as set forth in the preamble to the
U.S. Constitution, is not to create, but rather to "preserve" the blessings of
liberty already granted. As John Adams assured the American people,
"[y]ou have rights antecedent to all earthly governments: rights that cannot
310 Id.

311 Id. at 2297 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973)).
312 Id. at 2297-98. The Court rejected the vigorous arguments of Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe that there was no rational difference between permitting a person to refuse life sustaining
measures and permitting a person to obtain physician assistance in obtaining drugs which would end
life. Tribe noted that "Jane Doe didn't want the surgical removal of the [feeding] tube because that
would have left her in starving and dehydration-not just discomfort but... [in] agony for a couple of
weeks .. " United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Oral Argument of Laurence H. Tribe,
Esq., on Behalf of Respondents, 1997 WL 751912, at *31, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997) (No.
95-1858). Yet, Tribe noted, she had the right under New York law to have her feeding tube removed so
that she might die an agonizing death, but did not have the right to a comfortable and peaceful death by
drugs. See id.
313 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
314

BENNETT PATTERSON, THE FORGOTrEN NINTH AMENDMENT

RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 107, 109 (Randy Barnett ed., 1989).

(1955),

reprinted in THE
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315
be repealed or restrained by human laws."
Students of American history will recall that the 29 delegates who
arrived at Philadelphia in 1787316 were charged by the Confederation Congress only with "revising" the Articles of Confederation. They had no
authority to write a new constitution from scratch. Indeed, both Madison
and Hamilton must have wondered if the "jig was up" when John Lansing
of New York rose at the convention to ask "[i]s it probable that the states
(the Confederation Congress) ha[s]
will adopt and ratify a scheme which
3 17
propose?
to
us
authorized
never
Ratification was an uphill battle. Patriots such as Patrick Henry vehemently argued against ratification of the Constitution on grounds that if
it passed, all the sacred rights of liberty might be taken away by a powerful
central government.318 Patrick Henry said, "My mind will not be quitted
till I see something substantial come forth in the shape of a bill of rights."
319

Many Federalists argued against including of a Bill of Rights because
listing some rights, but not others, might be used to justify the expansion
of federal power. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, for example, argued that
there are many powers and rights which can not be particularly enumerated.... If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated, is presumed to be given. The conthe scale of
implied power into
sequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all
320
the government, and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.

James Madison, however, defended the Bill of Rights and sought to
address the concerns of Wilson and others. While recognizing these concerns, Madison defended the need for a Bill of Rights:
It has been objected also against a bill of those rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage the rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not singled
out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of
guarded against. I have
32 1
the fourth resolution.

315 Id. at 108.
316

Although some 55 delegates made an appearance on at least one day the convention was in

session, the average daily attendance never exceeded the original 29 who convened on May 25, 1787.
See ROBERT HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 75 (1994).
317 Id.at 77.
318 See Eugene M. Van Loan Ill, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV. 1
(1968), reprinted inTHE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 314, at 155.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 156 (quotation omitted).

321

Id. at 163-64 (emphasis omitted).
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This was the basis for including the Ninth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights. As originally drafted by Madison, the Amendment read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution;
but either an actual limi3 22
tations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

This history was not lost on Justice Goldberg who, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, appealed to the Ninth Amendment in
his Griswold concurrence: "[T]his Court... has never held that the Bill of
Rights . . . protects only those rights that the Constitution specifically
mentions by name. 3 23 Justice Goldberg specifically referred to Bennett
Patterson's book The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, 324 and explained that
"it cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be
without effect. ' 325 He noted that "to hold that a right so basic and fundamental may be infringed upon because the right is not guaranteed in so
many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore
the Ninth Amendment., 326 Justice Goldberg concluded that "the Ninth
Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental
rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed
327
exhaustive."
Although Justice Goldberg recognized that the Ninth Amendment
required striking down Connecticut's statute forbidding the use of contraceptives, he did not imply that the Ninth Amendment is directly applied
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Patterson, the author
upon whom Justice Goldberg relied upon in the opinion, however, treats
this question in great depth and concludes that the Ninth Amendment applies to the states, citing a mechanical error in the case of Lessee of Livingston v. Moore,328 and the majority opinions in Eilenbecker v. District
Court,32 9 Calder v. Bull, 330 and Loan Ass'n v. Topeka.331 Patterson notes
that any other construction would mean that "the several states reserve to
themselves the right to deny and disparage natural rights. This, could not

322
323
324
325
(1803)).
326
327
328
329
330
331

Id. at 163.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 n.1 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
PATTERSON, supranote 314.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490-91 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833).
134 U.S. 31 (1890), overruled in partby Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
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have been the intention of the First Congress. 33 2
Although Justice Goldberg's Griswold concurrence remains the
Court's most elegant exposition of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence, it
leaves open the question of what judicial guidelines should be followed in
identifying those "rights ...retained by the people." As a result, Justice
Black, in his Griswold dissent, expressed concern that relying on the Ninth
Amendment would give the Court an unparalleled and undemocratic veto
power over legislation enacted by the citizens of the states.3 33 In effect, any
five justices could strike any local or state law which offended their personal, or even whimsical, notion of "liberty."
Justice Black, therefore, would have upheld a state law forbidding all
citizens, including married couples, from using a condom or planning
families, on grounds that there was no specific prohibition in the Constitution restricting the states from prohibiting citizens from using contraceptives. Yet this is precisely the kind of interpretation that opponents of the
Bill of Rights feared-and it is the precise interpretation that Madison's
wording of the Ninth Amendment was designed to prevent.
Justice Harlan addressed Black's concern in his separate concurring
opinion in Griswold, noting that "specific provisions," no less than general
ones, "lend themselves as readily to personal interpretation by judges
whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in supposed tune with the time." 334 Harlan went on to assert that
U]udicial self-restraint... will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only
by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the
basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving
33 5
American freedoms.

Justice Black had a valid concern about the lack of principled standards for identifying rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. Without
clear standards he feared that the rule of law might become a rule of
men. 336 In the case of the Ninth Amendment, however, the principle of
strict construction is not violated by filling in a blank deliberately left open
by the drafters of the Constitution. The drafters of the Ninth Amendment
chose to enshrine "rights retained by the people" without enumerating
them, and left it to those charged under the Constitution with interpreting
the law to identify those rights.
Although Justice Harlan based his concurrence on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he, nevertheless, responded to Jus332

See PATTERSON, supranote 314, at 116.

333

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).

334 Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quotation omitted).
335
336

Id.
Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
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tice Black's concerns. Justice Harlan suggested a principled standard for
specifying the rights retained by the people can be identified by reference
to the "basic values that underlie our society."33' 7 And one basic value that
underlies our free society is that liberty shall be restrained only when there
is a clear and direct danger of harm to others.
But the Court has not evoked the Ninth Amendment in cases involving the right to privacy. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld a state
statute which imposed up to twenty years of imprisonment on people who
engaged in consensual sodomy. 338 Rather than applying the Ninth
Amendment, the Court engaged in the discredited Lochnerian "due process" analysis. The Court did not consider whether consensual sodomy presented clear and direct harm to others. Instead, the Court considered
whether the right to engage in sodomy was "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition. ' 339 Since American history books are mercifully deficient in providing details as to what husbands and wives did in the privacy of their bedrooms, the Court could find no "deeply rooted tradition"
for engaging in oral sex. Thus, the failure of the Framers to enumerate
rights led the Court to hold, wrongly, that unenumerated rights are not due
constitutional protection.
B.

A Right to Die under the Ninth Amendment

The right to die cries out for Ninth Amendment analysis. No right is
as personal as the right to control one's own body. As Justice Brennan's
Cruzan dissent declared, "Dying is personal. ' 34 Personal rights, whether
the right to use contraception or control the time and nature of one's own
death, are precisely the kind of rights which can and must be considered
under the Ninth Amendment.
The key to identifying what rights are protected under the Ninth
Amendment, is Justice Harlan's proposed "clear and direct harm to others"
standard. The Ninth Amendment should protect the right to physicianassisted suicide because there is no clear and direct harm inflicted upon
others when a terminal patient decides to end his suffering sooner with the
341
assistance of a physician.
The question must then be asked: how does the exercise of a right to
die by a suffering human, who's only alternative is a slow and agonizing
337 Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
338 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
339 Id. at 194.
340 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
341 In Griswold, the state of Connecticut claimed that permitting married couples to use a condom
would hurt others by "offending" them and by encouraging others to engage in extramarital sex. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505-06 (White, J., concurring). Apparently just the "thought" that others might be
using a condom was enough to emotionally "harm" those who abided by the law.
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death, hurt others? Is the answer to be along the lines espoused by the
State of Connecticut in Griswold, and which answer was so thoroughly
repudiated by that Court-namely, that the choice to die peacefully in the
presence of loved ones instead of alone and in agony somehow might "offend" other healthy members of society who do not have to endure such
suffering and agony?
A Ninth Amendment analysis, unlike the "due process" and "equal
protection" analyses in Glucksberg and Vacco, would vindicate the right of
free persons in a democratic, compassionate, and humane society, to control their own bodies and avoid the agonies of a hard and painful death.
Despite attempts to deny the right to die with a physician's humane assistance, terminal patients will continue to try to control how and when they
die. History is replete with examples of conduct prohibited by statute out
of concern for indirect harm on others. As history demonstrates, this is not
a successful strategy.
An early example of this strategy dates back to 1588, when Pope
Sixtus V issued the bull Effraenatum that declared abortion to be a sin
regardless of the age of the fetus. The Pope's enactment overturned a thousand years of Catholic dogma, which purported that a fetus was not "ensouled" until quickening.3 42 According to the renown Catholic theologian,
Thomas Acquinas, the notion of quickening, and what is "seed and what is
not seed is determined by sensation and movement."34' 3 Remarkably, this
view of abortion as being a sin only after quickening (i.e. after approxi344
mately the first trimester), accords with the principles set forth in Roe.
Pope Sixtus V issued the bull Effraenatum, "because of his concern
about prostitution in Rome. 345 The Pope intended the law to prevent harm
to people who were offended by the prostitutes escaping their just punishments. The Pope "believed that severe and rigid penalties for abortion and
contraception would diminish the incidence of this sexual sin." 3" The implied answer is that a prostitute, faced with the severe punishment of excommunication, would choose to carry an unwanted child as a lesser form
of punishment.347
Frequently when legislators prohibit conduct because of specious
notions of "harm," the law tends to produce the exact opposite of the intended result. For example, Romania imposed a draconian ban on all abor342 Robert M. Hardaway, Environmental Malthusianism: Integrating Population and Environmental Policy, 27 ENvTL. L. 1209, 1230 (1997).
343 Id. (quotation omitted).
344 See id.
345 JANE HURST, THE HISTORY OF ABORTION IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 15 (1983).
346 Id.
347 Pope Sixtus V's enactment was retracted after his death, but in 1869, Pope Pius IX declared
that Thomas Acquinas and a millenium of Catholic theology was wrong, and that the abortion of any
fetus, regardless of quickening, was a sin. See Hardaway, supra note 342, at 1230-3 1.
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tions and enforcement by secret police. Approximately sixty percent of all
pregnancies were terminated by abortion. 48 By contrast, abortion is legal
in the Netherlands, and that country enjoys one of the lowest abortion rates
in the world. 34 9
The American experiment with alcohol prohibition likewise illustrates
the folly of trying to prohibit people from making personal decisions about
their own lives. The consumption of alcohol was prohibited on the theory
that such consumption harmed not only the user, but others such as the
victims of crimes.35 0 In practice, however, the harms of Prohibition exceeded anything imagined prior to its imposition. The average annual consumption of liquor rose from 142 million gallons in 1917 on the eve of
Prohibition, to 285 million gallons at the height of Prohibition. 351 Further,
during Prohibition, crimes "involving violence or theft of property in352
creased by 13.2 percent.
Criminalizing drugs has had an equally devastating effect. The United
States did not have a serious drug abuse problem prior to
criminalization.35 3 Drugs were used moderately in such products as Mrs.
Winslows Soothing Syrup and Coca-Cola.35 4 Doctors even prescribed
opium as a treatment for alcoholism. 355 Eleven years after the enactment of
drug prohibition, however, some doctors began to question the law and
suggested the law did more harm than good.356
But governments did not apply the cruel lessons learned from Prohibition. Seventy years after criminalization of drugs, the original theory of
"harm" has been forgotten. In 1991, the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence without parole for possession of cocaine. 5 In the 1970's Georgia,
Louisiana and Missouri proscribed the death penalty for youths over 18
selling a marijuana cigarette to a youth under 18.358
348 See Karen Breslau, Overplanned Parenthood: Ceausescu's Cruel Law, NEWSEEK, Jan. 22,
1998, at 35.
349 See Abortion Rate in U.S. High, MIAMI HERALD, June 3, 1988, at 14A.
350

See MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION 53 (1991).

351 SEAN CASHMAN, PROHIBITION 253 (1981). Notably, while per capita alcohol consumption
dropped by thirty percent, the decline is overstated because of the rise in use of more potent alcohol,
represented under the term "liquor." See DANIEL K. BENJAMIN & ROGER LEROY MILLER, UNDOING
DRUGS 22 (1991).
352 THORNTON, supra note 350, at 122.
353 See JAMES OSTROwSK, THINKING ABOUT DRUG LEGALIZATION (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis
No. 121, 1989) (visited Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pastpal21.html>.
354 See Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The ProhibitionApocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483,
568 n.39 (1997) (noting that Coca-Cola originally contained cocaine); Victoria Henry, Problems with
PharmaceuticalRegulation in the United States, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 618 (1993) (noting that many
"soothing syrups" contained morphine).
355 See Ethan Nadelmann, Yes, AM. HERITAGE, Feb. 1993, at 45.
356 See OSTROWSKI, supra note 353.
357 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
358

See RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, THE CASE FOR LEGAIZING DRUGS 69(1991).
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Other countries have learned the lessons Americans should have
learned from Prohibition. In 1976, Holland legalized marijuana. As a result, marijuana use declined by a staggering thirty-three percent.3 59 In the
United States, a study by James Ostrowski revealed that when marijuana
was legalized in Alaska, use by high school seniors declined to four percent, compared to a 6.3 percent rate in other states where such drug use
was illegal and punishable by up to life in prison without possibility of
parole.3" Nobel prize economist Milton Friedman explains the staggering
drops in drug use after decriminalization on the fact that criminalization
makes a drug attractive as a "[florbidden fruit.

361

In 1985, an opinion survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice asked citizens to rank crimes in terms of their perceived seriousness
and "harm." Prostitution was ranked 174th in severity out of 204 crimes
(The offense ranked 175th was "a store owner who knowingly puts large
eggs in containers marked "extra large").362 AIDS rates in states which
have criminalized prostitution have skyrocketed in recent years. HIV
among prostitutes in the U.S. tends to be higher in states that prohibit
prostitution. For example, in Nevada counties where prostitution is legalized and regulated there are no reported cases of HIV since 1988.363
The foregoing demonstrates that when governments pass laws based
on specious notions of "harm," the laws can cause greater harm than
would otherwise exist without the prohibition. In these cases, it is unlikely
that the laws could withstand a Ninth Amendment inquiry into the "clear
and direct danger of harm to others" the laws purport to prevent.
C.

Recommendationsfor a Model Right to Die Statute

The Oregon Death with Dignity Act provides the right to die only to
Oregon residents who are diagnosed by a physician to be suffering from a
terminal disease (defined as a disease which will cause death within six
months) and who "voluntarily" express their wish to die.364 Although this
statute represents an admirable first step toward recognition of a right to
die, there are several problems with the statute.
During the oral argument in Glucksberg, Justice Scalia asked the at359

Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibitionin the U.S.: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives,

SCIENCE, Sept. 1, 1989, at 994.
360
(citation
361
362
363

Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 242, 253 (1991)
omitted).
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, TYRANNY OF THE STATUS Quo 138 (1984).
Jerry Taylor, Laws for Oldest Profession, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 1988, at 21.
See Stephen D. Pinkerton & Paul R. Ambramson, Effectiveness of Condoms in Preventing

HIV Transmission,44 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1303, 1303-12 (1997); see also Minouche Kandel, Whores in
Court: Judicial Processing of Prostitutes in the Boston Municipal Court in 1990, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 329, 331 (1992).
364 Oregon Death with Dignity Act § 3.01, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (1997).
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torney for Compassion in Dying,
Why is [the right to die] limited to those on the threshold of death? ....Why not those in
long term pain? ....Why shouldn't I have the right to suicide? ....
I hate to tell you, .. but the dying process of all of us has begun and is under way. It's
just a matter of time. And it seems to me that the patient who has ten years of agony to65look
forward to has a more appealing case than the patient who is at the threshold of death.

While Scalia was simply attempting to demonstrate that it is irrational to
limit the right to die to those patients who are terminally ill, his question
underscores the problems with the Oregon statute.
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act should be viewed as a tentative first
step on the road to full recognition of the right to die. If the right exists,
then it can and should not depend upon a physician's unreviewed and arbitrary "guess" as to how long a patient has to live. Physician predictions
of this sort are clearly unreliable since the amount of time a patient has to
live is dependent on so many variable factors beyond the knowledge of the
physician.
Thus the Oregon statute has two serious defects. First, it provides no
judicial review of the doctor's opinion. Under such a statute, patients
seeking the right will flock to a small group of doctors who gain a reputation for liberally predicting death within six months. Second, it removes
the right to die from the person who seeks to exercise the right, and places
it in the hands of another person. A true and fundamental right to die can
and should not depend upon the actions of third parties. The person wishing to exercise the right should be the sole determiner of when to exercise
3 66
the right.
It is true that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that incompetent persons do not exercise a right to die without fully understanding
both the right itself and the consequences of exercising that right. As
Scalia asked, "Why differentiate the person in physical pain from one
whose pain is emotional and feels that life is not longer worth living? ....
How can one differentiate emotional illness-here we focus on suicide
prevention-from the suffering of those who are dying?"367 Therefore, a
judicial determination of competence should be a prerequisite to the exercise of the right.
Leaving an individual clinician to determine a person's competence
365 WEBB, supra note 2, at 372 (quotation omitted).
366 Note that in Griswold, the Supreme Court did not condition the right of consenting persons to
use contraceptives on the whims or guesses of a third party. It was up to each individual person
whether or not to exercise the right to use a contraception device. To have conditioned this right on the
permission of a third party would have been to dilute the right beyond recognition.
367 WEBB, supra note 2, at 373. In response, Compassion in Dying's attorney asserted: "[M]ental
competency... is a bright line and the decision as to whether the patient is mentally competent is a
clinician's judgment..i.. Id.

1999]

THE RIGHT TO DIE AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT

makes the right to die depend on unreviewed judgments or guesses of a
third person. There is ample precedent for judicial review and oversight of
a determination of competency. Competency is judicially determined in
insanity commitments, will probates, and criminal cases. The competency
of a criminal defendant is never left to the unreviewed discretion of a
doctor or "clinician." The doctor may testify at the competency hearing, of
course, as may another doctor who disagrees. The judge or jury, however,
makes the final determination.
The same should be true for determining the competency of a person
seeking to assert his right to die. The following procedure is submitted as a
means of insuring that the right to die is fully recognized:
First, a person seeking to assert the right should have to file a petition
with a court having jurisdiction in the place where the right is to be asserted. The person seeking the right to die should not have to provide a
reason for asserting the right.
Second, an appropriate officer of the state should be entitled to file an
answer to the petition, opposing the exercise of the petitioner's right to die
on grounds that the petitioner is not competent to exercise the right. For
example, if the officer believes that the petitioner is irrational, or so emotionally distraught that it renders the petitioner "incompetent," the petition
may be resisted on those grounds.
Third, a hearing before a judicial officer should be held to adjudicate
the issue of competency. Whether the final decision should be by judge or
jury should be decided by local law. It is not necessary to create a long or
drawn out process. The petitioner should have the right to a hearing within
ten days of the filing of the petition, as well as the right to call any witnesses, such as doctors, clinicians, or family members. The state should
also have the right to call any witnesses, including doctors, that it sees fit.
Finally, upon a finding of competence, the court shall issue a document permitting petitioner to exercise the right to die, which document
may be submitted to any licensed physician willing to assist the patient to
assert his right.
CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that a majority of Americans support legalizing physician-assisted suicide, over twenty-five percent of those who die in the
United States every year die in agonizing pain-pain which is needless,
and which can be attributed directly to those who lack both compassion
and a willingness to recognize the fundamental right to die.
The issue is not whether the practice of physician-assisted suicide will
continue. Physician-assisted suicide will continue as long as compassion
for human suffering is greater than the fear of arbitrary enforcement of
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laws which infringe upon the fundamental right to die. Rather, the issue is
whether the practice will occur under a supervised and regulated regime.
With the exception of Oregon, which recognizes a limited right to
physician-assisted suicide, the right to die is limited to the right to "refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition." 368 As the Court recognized in Glucksberg, "a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions. '"369 In other words, the Court recognizes
the right to die in agony by refusing food, water, or oxygen, but not the
right to die by drugs without pain and in the presence of loved ones-a
distinction which constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has found to be a
"naively irrational, too neat a distinction that does not address how many
370
Americans actually die."
The Ninth Amendment acknowledges that people have not given the
government the power to infringe upon "rights .... retained by the people."
Identification of those rights is best accomplished by applying a standard
of determining whether the failure to infringe those rights would create a
clear and direct danger of harm to others.
Recognizing the fundamental human right to control one's own body
and to determine the manner and timing of one's own death does not create a "clear and direct danger of harm to others." Euthanasia, or the practice of killing others for purported reasons of "mercy" without the victim's
informed consent, has nothing to do with the practice of physician-assisted
suicide. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act represents an important first
milestone on what is sure to be a long and difficult road toward recognition of the fundamental human right to die. The next major step will be to
assert a Ninth Amendment right to die before the United States Supreme
Court. The plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Vacco failed to press this argument. Thus, the existence of a Ninth Amendment right to die therefore
remains an open legal question--even if the current Court shows little
indication that it wishes to rely upon the Ninth Amendment in deciding
cases.
Until the Ninth Amendment issue is addressed, the right to die will
continue to be evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment, where it receives no protection. Under the Due Process Clause, courts examine
whether an asserted right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." ' Yet this is the wrong question and therefore provide the
wrong answer. As in Bowers, in which the Court found no "history and
tradition" of oral sex between married individuals, or in Buck, in which
368
369

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 479 U.S. 261, 267 (1990).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1997) (citing Cruzan 497 U.S. at 279
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
370 WEBB, supra note 2, at 376.
371

Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quotation omitted).
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Oliver Wendell Holmes upheld forced sterilization on grounds that "three
generations of imbeciles are enough," conclusions based on a Due Process
analysis will diverge from what a sound Ninth Amendment analysis would
provide.
If courts fail to recognize the right to die under the Ninth Amendment, it will be necessary to continue the process of legalization state by
state through ballot initiatives and statutes. This is unfortunate. If Roe had
left the question of the right of a woman to control her own body to each
state, we would now be enduring the spectacle of the balkanization of
states on the issue of abortion, complete with underground railroads, continual challenges to the full faith and credit clause, and annual battles in
the legislatures of each state.
As the case of Ray Frank illustrates, acknowledging a fundamental
right to die will substantially reduce suicides in the United States.372 A
cause of death which takes the lives of one percent of the American population rightly deserves to be called an epidemic. Suicide is an epidemic in
the United States. Only by recognizing the fundamental right to die can the
scourge of suicide be abated, and the lives of millions of suffering people
be saved or prolonged.

372 See infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.

